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NOTES
Decontextualization of Musical Works:
Should the Doctrine of Moral Rights be
Extended?
Sarah C. Anderson*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of moral rights protects the non-pecuniary
interests of an artist in his or her work. The doctrine evolved from
a “societal concern about individual author’s and artist’s
personality and reputation investments as they are exhibited
through their creative work.”1 Civil law countries such as France
have broad moral rights doctrines whereas the United States places
emphasis on the economic concerns of artists. Thus, for a
significant part of the history of the United States, the federal
legislature and courts were reluctant to recognize the doctrine of
moral rights.2 For various reasons, the United States eventually
changed to provide some moral rights for artists, particularly those
who created works of visual art. Some scholars, however, suggest
that moral rights should be extended to protect musicians against
violations of their moral rights. This Note discusses the specific

*

J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.S. Allegheny College,
2003. The author would like to thank Professor Benjamin Zipursky for his assistance and
encouragement and the members of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal who contributed to the completion of this Note.

1
Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French
Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 426 (1999).
2
See generally SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY
AND MORAL RIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY
INTERESTS, 635–637 (2d ed. 1993).
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argument that musicians should be protected
decontextualization of their musical works.3
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from

the

Decontextualization is the use of an artist’s work in a context
with which the artist disapproves, thereby altering the integrity of
the work.4 In addition to arguing for such an extension, at least
one scholar, Rajan Desai,5 has proposed a moral rights scheme that
he argues should be implemented to protect musicians against
violations of their moral rights via decontextualization. Although
it may be true that musicians should be afforded greater control
over their work, this Note asserts that the arguments in favor of
protecting musicians against the decontextualization of their
musical works via moral rights are fatally flawed.
Part I of this Note outlines the fundamentals of moral rights
doctrine, focusing specifically on France as an example. Also
included in Part I is a discussion of the development of limited
protections of moral rights in the United States, including certain
provisions of copyright law, the Lanham Act, the Berne
Convention and the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).6
Part I also discusses unique aspects of the music industry that are
pertinent to an analysis of moral rights and music.
Part II explores the debate over the extension of moral rights to
protect against decontextualization of musical works. Opinions
from cases such as Shostakovich et al. v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp.7 and Franconero v. Universal Music Corp.8 illustrate
the reluctance of courts in the United States to extend the doctrine
of moral rights to provide such protection. The arguments used by
proponents of the extension are provided, and Desai’s proposed
moral rights scheme is also presented in detail in Part II.
Part III discusses the flaws in Desai’s specific proposal as well
as the various weaknesses in scholars’ arguments for the extension
3

See Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral Rights
for Music: A Need in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide
Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2001).
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See id.
7
80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948).
8
No. 02CV1963, 2003 WL 22990060 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003).
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of moral rights. Proponents often rely on legislation such as
VARA in formulating arguments for the extension of moral rights.
Part III thus thoroughly examines VARA, concluding that, were
the legislation to apply to musical works, it would not protect
musicians from the decontextualization of their creations.
This Note rejects arguments in favor of extending the doctrine
of moral rights to protect against the decontextualization of
musical works. In a legal system historically disinclined to
recognize the doctrine of moral rights, the adoption of such an
extension seems unlikely. Until proponents of the extension
suggest a workable moral rights scheme and provide more
persuasive arguments, the doctrine of moral rights should not be
extended to protect musicians against the decontextualization of
their musical works.
It should be noted that this discussion is limited to a very
specific issue. The pertinent question is whether proponents set
forth valid arguments for the extension of moral rights to protect
against the decontextualization of musical works. Thus, various
issues are set aside and questions remain unanswered in order to
facilitate a detailed exploration of the arguments dealing
specifically with the decontextualization of musical works.
I. MORAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE, PROTECTIONS OF ARTISTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
A. Moral Rights Doctrine
Moral rights doctrine seeks to protect the non-pecuniary
interests of an artist in his or her work.9 France is considered the
leader in the field of moral rights doctrine, and the term “moral
right” is a rough translation of the French term “droits moral.”10
The doctrine of moral rights “spring[s] from a belief that an artist
in the process of creation injects his spirit into the work and that
9

See Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of
Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 3 (1980).
10
See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 41, 41–42 (1998).
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the artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should
therefore be protected and preserved.”11 The moral right is thus
attached to the artist, rather than the work, and thus “remains
vested in the artist even after the object itself has been
transferred.”12
A highly developed moral rights doctrine generally includes
five separate rights, which include the rights of attribution,
integrity, disclosure, withdrawal, and resale royalties.13 For the
purposes of this discussion, only the rights of attribution and
integrity require further treatment.
The right of attribution ensures that an artist’s name will be
properly associated with his or her work.14 This is the least
controversial of the rights protected by the doctrine,15 and actually
includes three separate rights: 1.) the right to be recognized as the
creator of the work or to use a pseudonym or remain anonymous,
2.) the right to prevent the artist’s work from being attributed to
someone else and 3.) the right to prevent the artist’s name “from
being used on works which he did not in fact create.”16
The right of integrity is “considered by virtually all scholars to
be the most essential part of droit moral.”17 This right generally
allows the author to prevent changes that would deform or mutilate
his work, even after he has transferred the work to another
owner.18 An example of such mutilation would be the extensive
editing of a film to the extent that the end product no longer
accurately reflected the work of the creator.19 In some countries,
such as France, the right of integrity also allows the artist to
prevent the use of his work in a context that would change the

11

Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
DaSilva, supra note 9, at 12.
13
See Liemer, supra note 10, at 46–47.
14
See id. at 47.
15
See DaSilva, supra note 9, at 28.
16
Id. at 26.
17
Id. at 31.
18
See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2nd Cir. 1995).
19
See generally Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1976).
12
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meaning of the work or harm the artist’s reputation.20 The right of
integrity, however, has not traditionally been applied to protect the
artist from complete destruction of his work.21 Professor Susan P.
Liemer has noted that “[w]hile losing the work entirely may seem
the ultimate blow to the artist, the underlying idea is the artist’s
creative efforts and personal expressions cannot be misrepresented
by something that does not exist.”22
B. Protection of Moral Rights in the United States
In France, “moral rights are independent from and superior to
any pecuniary interest in a work of art.”23 In contrast, the law of
the United States “seeks to protect primarily the author’s pecuniary
and exploitative interests.”24 This is the principal reason that the
United States was reluctant to recognize an artist’s moral rights
and still does not have a broad moral rights doctrine. Before the
United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention, courts
refused to recognize the doctrine of moral rights.25 In certain
cases, however, courts would protect an artist’s moral rights by
applying United States copyright law as well as the Lanham Act.26
After signing on to the Berne Convention, which many scholars
20

See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americaine Twentieth
Century, Judgment of Jan. 13, 1954, 1 Gax. Pal. 191 [1954] D.A. 16, 80 (Cour d’Appel
Paris) (granting an injunction enjoining Twentieth Century Fox from further use of
plaintiffs-composers’ music in a film because the context of the music created an
implication that the composers were disloyal to their government).
21
See Liemer, supra note 10, at 51.
22
Id.
23
DaSilva, supra note 9, at 4.
24
Id. at 3.
25
See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2nd Cir.
1976) (“American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or
provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.”), Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 576 (1940) (“[T]he claim of this plaintiff that an artist retains in
his work after it has been unconditionally sold, where such rights are related to the
protection of his artistic reputation, is not supported by the decisions of our courts.”),
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff’d, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949) (“In the present state
of our law the very existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of the rights
thereunder with reference to the rights of others is not defined nor has the nature of the
proper remedy been determined.”).
26
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24–25.
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argue was done only to ease international criticism, Congress
amended the Copyright law to include greater moral rights
protection for the visual arts. Thus, although artists in the United
States are not protected by a sweeping moral rights doctrine, such
as that adopted in France, they are not completely without redress
in the case of a violation of their moral rights. This section
discusses the development of such protections within the United
States. Specifically, this section first explores moral rights
protections provided in Copyright law, then Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, the Berne Convention and finally VARA, an
amendment to the Copyright law enacted after the United States
became a signatory to the Berne Convention.
1. Copyright
United States copyright law provides some protection of an
artist’s moral rights. Regarding the specific issue of protecting
musicians’ works, copyright provides what would be categorized
as a protection of the right of integrity of a musical work when it is
being performed, or covered, by another artist via a compulsory
mechanical license.27 Under United States law, the owner of the
copyright in a musical work would be protected from the
deformation or mutilation, but not the decontextualization, of the
work.28 This limited protection is illustrated by the language used
in the copyright legislation:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the
performance involved, but the arrangement shall not
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work . . . .29
This provision demonstrates the balancing of the interests of
the artists in protecting the integrity of their work with the interests
of other artists in using the work as their own artistic and learning

27
28
29

See Desai, supra note 3, at 5–6.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115(a)(2) (2000).
Id.
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tool.30 In this narrow area of compulsory mechanical licenses, the
copyright law “works to further the goal of developing musicians
through cover music while still protecting the artist and song
through moral rights.”31
2. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Courts will sometimes apply Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
in a way which provides protection of an artist’s moral rights.32
Most often, courts interpret the Lanham Act to provide for the
moral right of attribution so that an artist receives proper
recognition for his or her work.33 The Lanham Act creates a cause
of action for an artist when another person uses the artist’s work in
interstate commerce, in a way which “misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin . . .” of the work.34
Some courts have interpreted the Lanham Act as providing
more than just the moral right of attribution, but also the right of
integrity. For example, in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.,35 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined that the extreme editing of a film by a broadcast
company constituted a violation of the Lanham Act.36 The court
noted that “the edited version . . . impaired the integrity of [the]
work and represented to the public as the product of appellants
what was actually a mere caricature of their talents. We believe
that a valid cause of action for such distortion exists . . . .”37
It should be noted, however, that an artist’s redress for
violations of moral rights under the Lanham Act are limited in that
they must satisfy three requirements in order to have a viable claim
under Section 43(a). These requirements are: 1.) that the goods or
services “in question must be involved in interstate commerce,” 2.)
30

See Desai, supra note 3, at 6.
Id.
32
See Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203,
1218 (2002).
33
See id.
34
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
35
See 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
36
See id. at 25.
37
Id.
31
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that the claimant must prove that they have standing to sue under
the Lanham Act, which is achieved by demonstrating “either a
competitive or commercial injury, which maintains a causal link to
misleading information” and 3.) that the claimant have “a genuine
interest protected by the act.”38 The artist’s protection is also
limited by the purpose of the Lanham Act, which is to prevent
consumer deception.39 Due to this limited purpose, the artist is
only protected “where overt mutilations occur to the extent that the
character of the work is changed so as to present a false
designation of origin.”40 Thus, even if an artist’s work is
deformed, if the public is not confused in regards to its origin, the
artist would not have a claim under the Lanham Act.41
3. The Berne Convention
In 1988, the United States signed on to the Berne Convention.42
The United States debated becoming a signatory for nearly 100
years due primarily to the Berne Convention’s inclusion of Article
6bis, which requires protection of the moral rights of attribution
and integrity.43 Article 6bis states:
Independent of the author’s economic rights, and even after
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.44
Once the United States joined the Berne Convention, Congress
passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.45 The
Implementation Act stated that the United States would adhere to
38

Suhl, supra note 32, at 1219.
See id. at 1227.
40
Id. at 1228.
41
See id.
42
See id at 1212.
43
See H.R. Rep. 101–514, H.R. Rep. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 (1990).
44
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 21886,
art. 6bis, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986).
45
Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
39
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the Berne Convention in the most limited sense, noting that
American law already provided adequate protection for the rights
included in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.46 For example,
laws dealing with unfair competition, copyright, contract,
defamation, and privacy were noted as sufficient protections of an
artist’s moral rights in their work.47
After signing on to the Berne Convention, Congress also
inserted a limiting provision into the United States Copyright law,
which stated:
Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title
that derive from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or
the common law, shall not be expanded or reduced by
virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.48
Some argue that the United States thus “joined the Berne
Convention to ease international criticism, while bowing to
domestic pressure by avoiding direct protection of Moral Rights
through a recycled argument of indirect protection.”49
4. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
In 1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act
(“VARA”), an amendment to United State Copyright law.50
VARA creates moral rights for limited categories of work.51
Musical works are excluded from the works protected by the
amendment.52 If an artistic work does fall within the definition of
46

Id.
See Suhl, supra note 32, at 1213.
48
17 U.S.C.A. § 104(c).
49
Suhl, supra note 32, at 1213.
50
Pub. L. No. 101-650 (tit. VI), 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (1990).
51
Id.
52
Id. § 602. Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
the paragraph defining “widow” the following:
A ‘work of visual art’ is—
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved,
or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
47
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“a work of visual art,” the artist is granted the moral rights of
attribution and integrity; and in the case of a work of “recognized
stature,” the right to prevent destruction of the work.53 VARA also
states that the rights provided in the amendment may not be
transferred but may be waived via a written “instrument signed by
the author.”54
Under VARA’s grant of the right of attribution, the author of a
work of visual art has the rights to claim authorship of the work,55
prevent the use of his name on art which he did not create,56 and
prevent the use of his name on his work in the event that it has
been distorted, mutilated, or modified in a way “which would be
prejudicial to his . . . honor or reputation.”57 VARA’s protection of
the right of integrity grants the visual artist the right “to prevent
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation.”58 The right of integrity also gives the artist the right to
“prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature.”59
Recovery for the violation of such rights is limited in several ways,
including when the modification is the result of the passing of
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing
in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include—
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering,
or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
Id.
53

Id. § 603 (2000).
Id. (2000).
55
See 17 USCA § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000).
56
See id. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (2000).
57
Id. § 106A(a)(2) (2000).
58
Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000). This section also states that any “intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.”
59
Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000). This section also states that any “intentional or grossly
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.”
54
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time, the nature of the materials, or the conservation or public
presentation of the work.60 Finally, the rights protected by VARA
belong only to the creator of the work of visual art, whether or not
that artist is the copyright owner.61
Some states have passed statutes that provide artists with moral
rights protections.62 Like VARA, state statutes remain unavailable
to musicians because protections are limited to the fine arts.63
Musicians may try to rely on state common law and seek moral
rights protection under state unfair competition laws, contract law,
defamation, or privacy.64 However, such laws seem unlikely to
protect a musician as adequately as a sculptor would be protected
by statutes, such as VARA, which explicitly recognize the rights of
attribution and integrity.65
State and Federal moral rights legislation is thus very limited,
especially when compared the law of droit moral in France.
Applying moral rights doctrine only to the fine arts, or the
narrower category of visual arts, “is far more limited than the
French law, which applies to virtually all art forms, and which
contains no restrictions based on the prominence of the artist or the
work.”66

60
61
62
63
64
65

See id. § 106A(c) (2000).
See id. § 106A(b) (2000).
See Desai, supra note 3, at 16.
See id.
See id.
See id. Desai states:
For state unfair competition remedies, one could theoretically obtain protection
if their name is misappropriated, but this is still tied to contract law, and any
remedy under contract law depends on the contract. Violations under state
unfair competition law does not present a claim of moral rights in and of itself.
Defamation presents an option for artists, but relates to harming an author’s
character, and though similar to the right of integrity, it does not cover
destruction of the work itself, which results in much less extensive protection
than the moral right of integrity. Lastly, an artist could attempt to seek
protection under invasion of privacy, but like defamation, such an action still
ties to use of the author’s name and not the work. Like defamation, such
privacy claims would not provide extensive protection as a substitute for moral
rights or a “quasi form of moral rights.

Id.
66

DaSilva, supra note 9, at 49.
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C. Aspects of the Music Industry
In order to draw any conclusions as to whether moral rights
doctrine in the United States should be extended to afford greater
protection for musicians, particularly protection against the
decontextualization of musical works, an exploration of certain
unique aspects of the music industry is required. Music licensing,
performance rights societies, and the presence of unequal
bargaining power in negotiations for recording contracts are
especially pertinent to this discussion.
United States copyright law regulates music licenses, which
include “print licenses, types of mechanical licenses, types of
synchronization licenses, performance licenses, and dramatic
Only mechanical,
performance and adaptation rights.”67
synchronization, and performance licenses warrant further
discussion. Mechanical licenses permit “reproduction of music in
forms that use a mechanical device to play sound, such as records
or compact disks.”68
As mentioned previously, copyright
provisions regulating compulsory mechanical licenses provide a
form of moral rights protection for the right of integrity.69
Synchronization (“synch”) licenses allow the “licensee to use . . . a
musical work in an audiovisual work, such as a motion picture or
television show.”70 Finally, a performance license “allows one to
perform a musical work publicly, and such a license is based on
the copyright owner’s exclusive right to perform the musical
work.”71
A problem arises in the area of performance licenses and public
performance of a musician’s work—it is impossible for musicians
to police all public performances of their work to ensure “their
economic interest in the performance right.”72 Performance rights
societies help resolve this problem by policing public places and

67
68
69
70
71
72

Desai, supra note 3, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See supra Part I(B)(2).
Desai, supra note 3, at 9.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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ensuring that artists receive payment for the use of their work.73
The owner of a music copyright, in joining a performance right
society, gives the society the authority to sublicense the
copyrighted work.74 Scholar Rajan Desai explains, generally, the
relationship between the music copyright holder, the performance
rights society, and the licensees, stating:
A person or entity that desires to obtain a performance
license from a performing rights society can pay an annual
fee for a blanket license that allows the licensee to perform
one or more titles in the society’s music catalog. A per
program license is also available to television stations
seeking a license from a performing rights society. After
receiving payment, a performing rights society distributes
royalties to the music writer and publisher.
....
Performing rights groups like ASCAP monitor the use of
songs in their catalog and have authorization from members
to bring suit against infringers.75
It is thus generally considered in the artist’s best interest to join
a performance rights society, and many record labels require artists
to do so.76
The final important aspect of the music industry for this
discussion is the process of negotiating recording contracts and the
inequality of bargaining power inherent in the industry.
Musicians, particularly new artists, often find that they retain little
control over their work once they have signed a contract.77
Popular music contracts traditionally transfer to the publisher all

73

See id. (noting that “performance rights societies include the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and
SESAC, Inc. formerly known as the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers.
These groups license use of musical works, police their use, and distribute royalties based
on use of these works.”).
74
Id. at 9.
75
Id.
76
See id. at 7–9.
77
Id. at 19.
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rights in copyright.78 Also, if a record company merges with or is
sold to another company, the contract with the original company
can be assigned to the new company.79 This means that
“musicians may find themselves in contracts with new record
companies that may not treat their music properly.”80
A
musician’s interest in how his or her music is used is thus often
ignored, especially when the musician is a new artist because “only
the most well-known artists are able to procure by contract those
rights which the law has not yet seen fit to protect.”81
II. DEBATING THE EXTENSION OF MORAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT
AGAINST DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSICAL WORKS
Many scholars argue that the United States should adopt a
more comprehensive moral rights scheme,82 such as the droit
moral in France, and that moral rights protections for musicians
are especially lacking.83 The narrower issue, for the purposes of
this discussion, is whether moral rights protection should be
extended to musical works in such a manner as would forbid use
by a non-composer, in certain contexts, with which the original
composer does not agree. Put differently, should the United States
extend moral rights doctrine to protect a musician from the
decontextualization of his or her work?

78

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
80
Id.
81
DaSilva, supra note 9, at 56; see also Desai, supra note 3, at 20–21(noting that
“newer artists tend to sign contracts that allow record companies to license [synch] rights
without their consent, whereas established artists can negotiate a requirement for their
consent in synch licenses.”).
82
See, eg., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Edward J. Damich, The Right of
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23
GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2001); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Autho–Stories:”
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
83
See, eg., Desai, supra note 3; Patrick G. Zabatta, Moral Rights and Musical Works:
Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095 (1992).
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Part A of this section explores the reluctance of legislatures and
court to expand the doctrine of moral rights. Part B introduces the
arguments in favor of extending moral rights to protect against the
decontextualization of musical works. Finally, Part C sets forth
scholar Rajan Desai’s proposed moral rights scheme.

A. Shostakovich and Franconero: Exploring the Reluctance to
Expand Moral Rights Doctrine
Legislatures and courts in the United States refuse to extend
moral rights doctrine to grant musicians a moral rights claim.
Scholars such as DaSilva argue that droit moral, as it exists in
France, may not be adopted in the United States “without a
complete overhaul of our copyright law and its implicit conception
of the relationship between artists and society.”84 In addition,
DaSilva argues that “[w]e may find, too, that the moral rights
doctrine is not worth the ideological transformation which it might
require.”85
Courts that have dealt with the issue of
decontextualization in the United States apparently agree with such
arguments.
The case that best illustrates the position of American courts on
this issue is Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.86
In that case, the New York Supreme Court for New York County
dismissed a claim by four Soviet Russian composers who sought to
enjoin the use of their music, which was in the public domain and
thus enjoyed no copyright protection.87 Twentieth Century-Fox
produced a picture entitled “The Iron Curtain”, a film of 87
minutes which had an anti-Soviet theme.88 The film reproduced
plaintiffs’ music for a total time of 45 minutes.89 The composers
argued that the use of their music indicated their approval of the

84

DaSilva, supra note 9, at 57.
Id.
86
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff’d, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949).
87
See id. at 576..
88
See id. at 576–78.
89
See id. at 576.
85
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themes contained therein and thus falsely implied that they were
disloyal to their country.90
The court rejected these arguments, first stating that “[t]he use
of the music can best be described as incidental, background
matter.”91 The court noted that the arguments set forth in the claim
inevitably led to the doctrine of moral rights.92 The application of
the doctrine, said the court, presented much difficulty, especially in
a case in which there was “no charge of distortion of the
compositions nor any claim that they have not been faithfully
reproduced.”93 The court noted that the state of the law was
unclear as to the norm by which the work should be tested and the
proper remedy to be granted.94 In considering the test that should
be applied, the court asked, “Is the standard to be good taste,
artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to
be?”95
Shostakovich is an example of the attempted use of the right of
integrity to remedy an injury to the artist’s reputation.96 It may be
that composers such as those involved in the case should have
some means of protection from this sort of harm.97 However,
DaSilva notes that, even in France, “the broad extension of [the
moral right of integrity] to achieve that purpose is of questionable
legal basis, [because] scholars still question whether protection of
the artist’s reputation—as opposed to protection of the work
itself—is an appropriate application of [droit moral].”98
A more recent example of an American court refusing to
extend moral rights doctrine to protect against the
decontextualization of a musical work is Franconero v. Universal
Music Corp.99 Franconero was a famous singer in the 1950s and
1960s and the defendants, UMG, were free to license Franconero’s
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See id. at 578.
Id. at 576.
See id. at 578.
Id.
See id. at 578–79.
Id. at 579.
DaSilva, supra note 9, at 3.
Id.
Id.
70 U.S.P.Q.2D 1398 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 18, 2003).
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music because there were no “contractual restrictions to the
contrary.”100 In the 1990s, UMG issued synch licenses for
Franconero’s music to be used in the films “Jawbreaker” and
“Postcards from America.”101 Both films contained scenes of
homosexuality, suicide, prostitution and rape, which Franconero
found objectionable.102 The objection to the use of her music in
such films could very likely be attributed to the fact that, in 1974,
Franconero was raped and tortured, and after these events she
suffered from mental anguish, developed drug dependencies and
also attempted suicide on more than one occasion.103
In Franconero, since the defendants had contractual rights to
issue synch licenses, the plaintiff had to rely on non-contract
theories such as tort law, state civil rights law, and foreign moral
rights arguments.104 The court noted that “[t]hese buckshot claims
suffer from the common and obvious fatal flaw that UMG had the
contractual right to issue the synch licenses that it issued.”105 The
court dismissed the moral rights claims, holding that United States
law did not recognize moral rights with respect to musical
performances, and the court refused to rely on principles of
international law.106 Also noted was the plaintiff’s concession that
the songs were not altered or deformed, arguing instead that the
use of the songs in the films “was enough to distort them and
subject UMG to a moral rights claim.”107 The court stated,
“Recognition of such a claim would subject everyone who issues a
synch license to potential liability under foreign law or would grant
veto power over licenses to those, like [Franconero], who have
transferred their rights without reservation.”108 Thus, the decision
left Franconero without a remedy.

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at *4–5.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *2–3.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *5.
Id.
See id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id.
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B. Advocating for the Extension of Moral Rights to Protect
Against the Decontextualization of Musical Works
Cases such as Shostakovich and Franconero illustrate decisions
that lead to “the common contention that American law has not
evolved doctrines which adequately protect the artist’s rights of
personality in his or her own work.”109 Proponents of the
extension of moral rights doctrine to protect against
decontextualization of a musical work utilize a variety of
arguments and often argue that the United States should look to
France as a model because French law considers
decontextualization adverse to the artist’s “reputation and honor,
thereby impairing her legally protected integrity interest.”110 This
belief is illustrated by the fact that when Shostakovich brought an
identical claim in France, he succeeded and received an injunction
enjoining Twentieth Century-Fox from further use of his music.111
The French court found “that the production company infringed
upon the artists’ rights of integrity when it injected the music into
an unintended context.”112
Proponents of the extension also argue that the general theories
underlying the moral right doctrine support its application to
musical works. One of such theories is that art plays an important
role in, and is valuable to, society. The social value of art is
illustrated by various statements made by Representatives in
support of the enactment of VARA.113 Representative Markey, for
example, stated that “[a]rtists in this country play a very important
role in capturing the essence of culture and recording it for future
generations. It is often through art that we are able to see truths,
both beautiful and ugly.”114 Recognition of the importance of
109

DaSilva, supra note 9, at 2.
Francesca Garson, Before that Artist Came Along, It was Just a Bridge: The Visual
Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork, 11 CORNELL J.L & PUB.
POL’Y 203, 212 (2001).
111
See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americaine Twentieth
Century, Judgment of Jan. 13, 1953(1953) 1 Gaz. Pal. 191 (1954) D.A. 16, 80 (cour
d’Appel Paris).
112
Garson, supra note 110, at 212.
113
See generally H.R. Rep.
114
H.R. Rep., supra note 43, at 6916 (citing 135 Cong. Rec. E2227 (daily ed. June 20,
1989)(statement of Representative Markey).
110
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artwork leads to the conclusion that a moral rights doctrine is
beneficial because it results “in a climate of artistic worth and
honor that encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.”115
Thus, the argument goes, the societal value of art requires that
artists be encouraged to create, which may be achieved by
developing a moral rights doctrine.116
Those who believe musicians should also enjoy moral rights in
their work argue that music is also highly valued by society and
should thus be protected.117 Desai argues that “music can inspire
and deeply affect people’s lives,” and when a “song is played and
used out of context, such use desecrates the song, musician, and
listeners.”118 Inherent in this line of argument is the idea that there
is no reason to protect only the visual arts and that musicians
should also be protected by legislation such as VARA.119
Proponents of this type of extension argue that, although protection
of pecuniary interests may encourage musicians to create new
works, providing musicians with additional moral rights
protections would be more effective.120 Russell J. DaSilva notes
that the failure of the federal government to create such moral
rights for musicians may establish “a legal notion of intellectual
property which puts the rights of the copyright proprietor above the
rights of the artistic creator. By ignoring moral rights, federal law
creates a fundamentally ‘amoral’ copyright.”121
Finally, some argue that moral rights protections against
decontextualization are necessary for musicians in particular due to
certain unique aspects of the music industry, which leave
musicians vulnerable to violations of their moral rights.122
Musicians may often find their interests ignored once they have
With regards to
signed a recording contract.123
decontextualization, however, the most pertinent aspects of the
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 6915.
See Liemer, supra note 10, at 3.
See Desai, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
See id. at 20.
See id.
DaSilva, supra note 9, at 6.
See generally Desai, supra note 2.
See supra Part I(C).
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music industry are performance rights societies and their ability to
issue synch licenses.124
Although performance rights societies protect musicians in that
they ensure that artists will receive royalty payments for the use of
their songs, it is argued that such organizations “fail to protect use
of musical works outside the context of their meaning, and in
providing blanket licenses, may affect the interest of musicians
negatively.”125 Desai notes that “any musician would be wise to
join a performance rights society, but in doing so, the musician
allows another entity to decide in what context the public
performance of his or her song occurs.”126 Thus, artists may find
their music incorporated into visual works or being performed in
contexts which the artist does “not feel articulate the artistic vision
of their creation.”127 An extension of moral rights, it is said, would
alleviate such problems.
C. Rajan Desai’s Proposed Moral Rights Scheme
Desai argues for an extension of moral rights doctrine to
protect musicians against decontextualization of their musical
works and proposes a moral rights scheme that could be
implemented in the U.S.128 The first aspect of Desai’s scheme
involves the amending of the United States copyright code to
require artist consent for synch licenses.129 Desai notes that this
right could be waived in a contract, but that the mere codification
of the right would “make the artist more comfortable with contract
negotiations and provide more control for the artist over his or her
work.”130 This prong of Desai’s scheme deals exclusively with the
relationship between the artist and the record company.
The second prong of Desai’s proposed moral rights scheme
addresses the issue of musicians losing control of how their music
is used via performance licenses issued by performance rights
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Desai, supra note 3, at 8.
Id. at 21.
Id.
See id. at 21–23.
See id. at 21.
Id.
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societies.131 Desai suggests that musicians be given a cause of
action based on the moral right of integrity in order to control how
their music is used and prevent the use of their music in a context
that they find objectionable.132 Desai explains that the moral rights
action would rarely be used,133 but that the cause of action should
exist so that if an artist finds that one of his songs is being used in a
way that is offensive to him, he could prevent further use of the
song in that particular manner.134 Under Desai’s scheme, the artist
would have a claim against the licensor-performance rights society
as well as the licensee.135 Desai notes that the proper remedy
would be an injunction because “one cannot expect the licensor
and licensee to sense the artistic vision of a musician and know the
appropriate context for performance of a song. . .”136 The initial
remedy would thus be an injunction, and if the use of the song
persisted, the musician could then seek damages.137 The final
aspect of this prong of Desai’s proposed moral rights scheme is
that “a waiver provision could exist to allow an artist to forego any
future moral rights, and give liberty to performance rights societies
and the artist.”138 Desai thus allows for the waiver of both of his
proposed solutions.
Desai uses Bruce Springsteen’s song “Born in the U.S.A.” to
illustrate how this proposed moral rights scheme would work in
application.139 The song is meant to be critical of the United States
government in telling the story of a “disillusioned Vietnam War
Veteran,”140 but Desai states that the song, if misunderstood, could
131

See id. One may question why, in order to retain control over how their music is
used, a musician would not simply forgo becoming a member of a performance rights
society such as ASCAP or BMI. However, Desai explains that “These groups provide a
valuable service of monitoring use of songs and providing economic returns. A musician
would act foolishly by not enrolling in one of these groups, and likely, a record company
would act foolishly if it allowed an artist on its label to not join one of these groups.” Id.
132
See id. at 22.
133
See id. This is so, Desai states, “. . .because an artist cannot be expected to
extensively police use of his or her musical works.” Id.
134
See id.
135
See id.
136
Id.
137
See id.
138
Id.
139
See generally Desai, supra note 3.
140
Id. at 22.
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be used in stadiums to incite feelings of patriotism.141 Under
Desai’s model, “[i]f Springsteen could show that his song has been
used outside the context of his artistic vision for it, and the use has
offended his integrity, . . . [he could] get an injunction against the
particular licensor and licensee for the specific use in question.”142
III. UNWORKABLE PROPOSALS AND FLAWED ARGUMENTS:
PROPONENTS FAIL TO MAKE A STRONG
CASE FOR EXTENSION
The argument that musicians deserve greater control over their
work is compelling because granting such artists protection and
control will likely encourage them to create new works. However,
the proposals set forth and the arguments relied upon by
proponents of moral rights protections against the
decontextualization of musical works are fatally flawed. In
particular, the specific flaws in Desai’s proposed moral right
scheme and the mistaken reliance on VARA, utilized by many
proponents of the extension of moral rights, are discussed below.
Unless stronger arguments are made and more workable standards
suggested, moral rights should not be extended to protect
musicians against the decontextualization of their work.
A. Desai’s Problematic Moral Rights Scheme
Although Desai seeks a solution that would ideally result in
additional control for musicians over their work, his proposal does
not set forth a workable standard for the protection against
decontextualization of musical works. First, Desai’s scheme is far
too broad and fails to address a standard that should be applied by
courts if a moral rights cause of action were, in fact, created. Desai
states that a court should grant an injunction if an artist can show a
violation of integrity or that his “song has been used outside the
context of his artistic vision for it.”143 Such a statement completely
neglects, however, any explanation of how a court would
141
142
143

See id.
See id. at 22–23.
Id. at 22.
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determine whether there had been such a violation of the artist’s
vision for his work. This was a fundamental objection of the
American court that dismissed Shostakovich, asking whether the
standard should be “good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs,
moral concepts” or some other standard.144 Interestingly, Desai
never refers to Shostakovich.145
Shostakovich and Franconero illustrate the wide array of cases
that could fall within the protection of Desai’s broad moral rights
scheme. In Shostakovich, the plaintiffs argued that the use of their
music implied something false about their political beliefs, i.e., that
they were disloyal to their government. In Franconero, however,
the plaintiff did not seem to argue that the use of her music created
any false implications about her. Rather, Franconero simply found
the use of her work in such a context “objectionable.” Should a
court grant an injunction simply because the artist does not agree,
generally, with the use of their work in a certain context? Or
should an artist be required to show that the decontextualization
had the same effect as making a false statement about him,
bringing his claim closer to one of defamation? If so, would the
false implication be grounded on the subjective146 belief of the
artist? Or would the standard be whether a reasonable person
would believe that the use of a musical work created the
implication asserted by the artist? Such questions demonstrate that
there is a huge rift in Desai’s proposed scheme. Desai leaps from
creating a cause of action to describing the remedy without
explaining what, exactly, an artist should have to show in order to
prove that his moral rights had been violated by the
decontextualization of his work.
The second major flaw in Desai’s proposed scheme is that he
allows for the waiver, via contract, of both of the rights his scheme
144

Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff’d, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949).
145
In fact, Desai states that “[h]ypothetically, an artist could find their song used in a
certain scene in a movie they do not want their song used in.” Desai, supra note 3, at 21.
And yet this is exactly what happened in Shostakovich.
146
DaSilva notes, “[T]he right of integrity, in the end, is based on artistically subjective
judgments which are inappropriate to judicial examination, for French courts, like
American courts, are reluctant to pass judgment on literary or artistic merit.” DaSilva,
supra note 9, at 37.
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creates—the right of the artist to require that he give consent
before a license is issued for the use of his work, and the moral
right of an artist to stop an individual from using his work in a
manner which the artist finds objectionable. Before proposing his
moral rights scheme, however, Desai notes that “many new
musicians sign whatever agreement they get in order to ensure
some recording deal.”147 Desai argues that the codification of the
first right and the development of a cause of action for the second
would give the artist more comfort in the negotiating process.
Although this may be true, it still seems unlikely that the artist
seeking a contract with a recording company, given the customs of
the recording industry previously mentioned, would refuse to
waive the right. Thus, by providing for a waiver, Desai takes away
the rights that he attempts to give the artist via the proposed moral
rights scheme.
Desai appears to approve of the very liberal doctrine of droit
moral in France, and is thus inconsistent in proposing a scheme
that allows for waiver of his consent requirements and moral rights
claim. After all, droit moral, “is deemed by statute to be ‘personal,
perpetual, inalienable, and unassignable’ and at least in theory, it
cannot be abandoned by the author by contract or will.”148 Even
VARA, which allows for the waiver of the moral rights granted to
visual artists, would not allow for the type of waiver granted by
Desai’s moral rights scheme. The waiver permitted by VARA
“applies only to the specific person to whom the waiver is made,”
149
and cannot be transferred to a third party.150 In addition, the
written instrument by which the artist waives his moral rights
“must specifically identify the work and the uses of the work to
which the waiver applies”, and the waiver will “apply only to that
work and those uses.”151 Thus, VARA does not permit blanket
waivers.
147

Desai, supra note 3, at 18.
Id. at 4–5 (quoting Loi du 11 mars 1957 Sur La Propiété Littéraire Artistique, [1957]
J.O., translated in UNESCO, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (1976), Article
6.
149
H.R. Rep. 101–514, H.R. Rep. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6928–29 (1990).
150
See id. at 6929.
151
Id.
148
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If VARA were extended to protect musicians, Desai’s
proposed process of contracting to waive moral rights would not be
permitted. VARA does not provide for blanket waivers and
requires an artist to waive his or her rights in a written instrument
for each licensee. Desai, however, mistakenly suggests that an
artist could contract with performance rights societies to give them
freedom in issuing licenses. Desai also suggests that an artist who
did not waive his rights could have a cause of action against the
performance rights society as well as the licensee. If VARA
applied to musicians, however, the artist could not sign a blanket
waiver with the performance rights society, who would then
transfer the waiver to the licensees. The waiver aspects of Desai’s
proposed scheme are thus unlikely to be adopted by the legislature
or courts. More importantly, the allowance of waivers run contrary
to Desai’s liberal stance on moral rights in that the waivers are
highly likely to be used in the music industry and therefore negate
any protection that Desai attempts to create for musicians.
B. Proponents Mistakenly Rely on VARA
Desai and other scholars who argue for the extension of moral
rights to protect against the decontextualization of musical works
make a grave mistake in basing their arguments on VARA. They
argue that music is just as valuable as the visual arts and also
deserves protection under federal legislation. This reasoning does
not support the argument that musicians should be protected
against decontextualization because it is not clear that the
decontextualization, or relocation, of a work of visual art would
constitute a violation of an artist’s rights under VARA.152 This
section of the discussion should not necessarily be read to support
the protections and limitations set forth in VARA. It merely seeks
to illustrate that proponents of extending VARA to protect
musicians wrongly assume that the extension would provide for
protection against decontextualization of musical works.
The legislative history of VARA, particularly the House Report
of the Committee on the Judiciary, suggests that the
decontextualization of an artist’s work, thereby implying a false
152

See id. at 6928–29.
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fact about the artist, would not be a violation of the amendment.
The report states:
[T]he best approach to construing the term ‘honor or
reputation’ . . . is to focus on the artistic or professional
honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the
work that is protected. The standard used is not analogous
to that of a defamation case, where the general character of
the plaintiff is at issue. In a suit for a violation of the rights
accorded under [VARA], any evidence with regard to the
latter is irrelevant.153
This statement suggests that even if VARA protected
musicians, it would not protect an artist asserting a claim such as
that asserted by the plaintiffs in Shostakovich. The plaintiffs there
would not be able to rely on the argument that the use of their
music in “The Iron Curtain” implied that they were disloyal to the
Soviet government. This is because the argument is very similar to
a defamation claim, asserting that the falsity implied via the
context of the music harmed the artists’ reputations. This type of
evidence seems to be exactly what the Committee on the Judiciary
classified as irrelevant.
The reasons given for limiting the scope of VARA also
indicate that the statute was not intended to protect a visual artist
from the decontextualization or relocation of his or her work, and
therefore would not, contrary to what proponents of the extension
suggest, protect musicians against decontextualization of their
work. Congress limited the works of visual art covered by the
amendment to originals, i.e., “works created in single copies or in
limited editions.”154 The reasons for limiting the scope of the
amendment were primarily based on the “critical factual and legal
differences in the way visual arts and audiovisual works are
created and disseminated.”155
The Committee on the Judiciary specifically mentioned
differences such as the fact that works of visual art created in
single copies or limited editions “are generally not physically
153
154
155

Id. at 6925.
Id. at 6919.
Id.
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transformed to suit the purposes of different markets. Further,
when an original of a work of visual art is modified or destroyed, it
cannot be replaced. This is not the case when one copy of a work
produced in potentially unlimited copies is altered.”156 In seems
undeniable that such language intends only to protect the integrity
of the work itself from distortion or mutilation, rather than the
artist from the harm of having his or her work used in a manner
which the artist finds objectionable.
Finally, the language of the amendment itself suggests that it
would not protect an artist against the decontextualization of his or
her work of visual art, and thus, if extended, would not do so for
musicians. Within the VARA is a list of exceptions to what will be
considered a violation of the right of integrity. Most importantly,
the list of exceptions states that the modification of a work that is
the result of “the public presentation, including lighting and
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation,
or other modification . . . unless the modification is caused by
gross negligence.”157 This suggests that once an individual or
entity has permission to display a work of visual art, they are given
liberty in choose how to do so, so long as that presentation does
not include a physical modification or distortion of the work. By
analogy, it seems that the decontextualization of musical would not
be protected if VARA were extended. That is, once a license is
granted to use a musical work, the licensee would have the
freedom to choose how to present the work so long as such a
presentation of the work did not substantially change or distort the
music, for example the melody or lyrics. Thus, if Congress
amended VARA to protect musicians, it seems the amendment
would not prevent the decontextualization of a musical work. This
is yet another flaw in the arguments used by proponents of such an
extension.
Few courts have had to address whether the relocation of a
work of visual art, or the changing of its surroundings, would be a
violation of the rights established by VARA when the work itself
is not damaged. It seems, however, that courts are unlikely to
156
157

Id.
17 USCA § 106A(c)(2).
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apply VARA to works that have not suffered a physical mutilation
or distortion. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.158 serves as an
excellent example. In that case, a sculptor had created sculptures
to be presented in a park. He sought an injunction, under VARA,
preventing the owners of the park from relocating one of his
sculptures.159 The sculptor argued that his work was “sitespecific” and that the location of the sculpture was a “constituent
element of the work.”160 Plaintiff argued that the relocating of
sculpture would thus destroy the work. The sculptor offered an
alternative argument that the park as a whole was a work of visual
art and thus could not be modified. The court rejected the
argument that the park would constitute a work of visual art under
VARA.161 The court also rejected the argument that the sculptor’s
“site-specific” work was protected by VARA because the plain
language of the statute excludes the right to the “placement or
public presentation” of a work of visual art.162 The court noted
that the VARA provision excluding public presentation “has been
interpreted to exclude from VARA’s protection ‘site-specific’
works, works that would be modified if they were moved.163
Although only a limited number of courts have addressed the
issue of whether VARA protects the relocation of “site-specific”
work, it seems unlikely that courts will interpret the amendment to
protect against this kind of decontextualization. This is yet another
example of the inherent flaws in the argument that VARA should
be extended to protect musicians and grant a right to prevent the
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the artist and the purchaser waiving this right.” Id. at 92–93. Such a holding suggests
that proponents of the extension of moral rights to protect against the decontextualization
of musical works might find more success in basing their arguments on state law rather
than VARA.
159

ANDERSON

2006]

5/18/2006 11:34 AM

DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSICAL WORKS

897

decontextualization of musical works. The legislative history,
language, and judicial interpretation of the amendment suggest that
such a right does not currently exist for visual artists, and thus
would not exist for musicians if the statute were extended.
CONCLUSION
Consideration of the development of moral rights protections in
the United States reveals that the extension of moral rights doctrine
seems unlikely. If it is possible to convince the legislature and
courts to extend the law to protect musicians more adequately,
only the strongest arguments for extension will do so. Thus far,
proponents have not implemented arguments of the requisite
strength for the extension of moral rights to protect against
decontextualization of musical works. Moral rights doctrine is
unlikely to be, and should not be, extended until workable moral
rights schemes and compelling arguments are presented.

